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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

INCREASE OF CORPORATE INDEBTEDNESS UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS REQUIRING CONSENT OF STOCKHOLDERS
It has been pointed out unassailably that the traditional concept of corporate
control by stockholders is becoming in practice increasingly fictional. Through a
great variety of devices, of all degrees of complexity, actual control of policy within
the modern corporation is concentrated in the hands of a small group of persons,
called "management" or "control," connected with the corporation in varying
capacities, but rarely owning among them a majority of the shares.'
Just some such development was long ago foreseen and its occurrence sought
to be guarded against by a variety of restrictions on the management of corporations imposed by constitution, statute, and decision. This note seeks to discuss one
such restriction and to evaluate its significance to 2the present-day corporation.
The Constitution of Pennsylvania provides:
"The . . . indebtedness of any corporation shall not be increased
except in pursuance of general law, nor without the consent of persons holding the larger amount in value of the stock first obtained
at a meeting called for the purpose, first giving 60 days public notice,
as may be provided by law."
Several state constitutions contain a like provision, 8 and others a provision in
4
virtually identical language as to "bonded indebtedness." The discussion herein
will pertain particularly to the general increase of indebtedness provisions, but
5
much of it will be equally applicable to the bonded indebtedness provisions.
6
The provisions are generally implemented by statutes, some of which use
nearly identical language. 7 Some of the statutes set up more detailed procedural
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pasfim, and especially Ch. VIII.
2Art. XV76 Sec. 7.

SN.
D. CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 138; S. D. CoNsT., Art. XVII, Sec. 8, e. g.
4

ALA. CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 234; ARK. CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 8; Mo. CONST., Art. X1I,
Sec. 8; OKLA. CONST., Art. IX, Sec. 39.
5Divisions headed Puroose and Effect of the Provisions.
6ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7015; POPE'S DIG. (Ark., 1937) § 2135 (a); N. D,
COMP. L. (1913) §4559; 18 OKLA. STAT. ANN, § 129; Mo. STAT. ANN,, ch. 2, §4546; Act
of May 5, 1933, P. L. 364, Sec. 309, 15 PURD. STATS, (Pa.) § 2582.
7N. D. ComP. L. (1913) §4559; Mo. STAT. ANN., ch. 32, § 4546. The Arkasas statute
giving corporations powers to deal with property generally incorporates the constitutional provision
by reference. PopE's Dir. (Ark., 1937) § 2135 (a). The Pennsylvania statute presents an
anomalous situation. The constitutional provision requires the consent of the holders of larger
amount in value of the shares, while the statute requires the consent of the "holders of at least a
majority of the outstanding shares." This inconsistency might become very important in the light
of the frequent corporate practice of issuing voting shares of very small value, for control, and
more valuable shares, of smaller or no voting power, for investment. See BERLE AND MEA qS,
op. cit. supra, 76-77. No case has arisen which deals with the problem. See Metzger, The
Business Corporation Law, (1933) 38 Dici. L. REv. 77, 86.
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requirements, such as the machinery for giving notice of the meeting, but gen8
erally tney add nothing of a substantive character. At least one state appears to
have no statute, indicating that there the constitutional provision is deemed to be
self-executing. 9
PURPOSE OF THE PROVISIONS

The general intention of the provisions and statutes is clear, their purpose
less so. The consensus seems to be that their object is the protection of stockholders. 10 It has been intimated that it is the interest of the minority which is
sought to be protected." Since a bare majority in value of the shares can in some
of the states consent to the increase,' 2 the virtue of this theory is not apparent.
But, in some states at least, non-voting shareholders may vote on the question of
increase of indebtedness, 18 and thus a policy of protecting them may readily be
inferred. Quite aside from the question of shareholder's rights inter sese, it can
safely be said that the measures seek to give the shareholders a more direct control
over management policy in cases of more than ordinarily direct interest to the
shareholders. That protection of stockholders from improvident financing on
the part of management is the purpose is indicated by the fact that waiver by or
estoppel of stockholders will cure the defect resulting from the absence of consent, 14 and that in most cases only the stockholders have a clear right to assert the
illegality of indebtedness so created.' 5

BE. g., 18 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 129; 15 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 2582-309. But the North
Dakota statute (CoMp. L. 1913 § 4559) provides that the penalty for violation of its requirements shall be personal liability on the parties concerned.
9South Dakota. But see provision forbidding directors to increase indebtedness to amount
greater than capital stock: S. D. REV. CODE. (1919)? § 8789, and one permitting stockholders by
three-fourths vote to compel sale or mortgage of corporate property. Id. § 8784.
'oWesterlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599, 613 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913) ; Hillcrest
Land Co. v. Foshee, 189 Ala. 217, 218, 66 So. 478 (1914); Riesterer v. Horton; Land & Lumbet
Co., 160 Mo. 141, 61 S. W. 238 (1901); FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed.
1931) §2655; 13 AM. JuR. 901. See Rochester Savings Bank v, Averell, 96 N. Y. 4671 473
(1884); Note (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 1074, 1076; (1936) 49 HAtv. L. REV. 481.
1
"2 See Commerce Trust Co. v. Chandler et al., 284 Fed. 737, 740 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922).
1 E. g. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 7015; ARK. CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 8, ineorported by reference into statute: POPE'S DIG. (Ark., 1937) § 2135 (a) ; Mo. STATS. ANN., ch.
32, § 4546; S. D. CONST., Art. XVII, Sec. 8. See note 7, supra.
13E, g. Alabama ("... by the consent of the persons holding tho larger amount in value of
the entire outstanding capital stock"); Pennsylvania (". . . the holders of at leasta majority of
all outstanding shares") Most of the statutes do not so clearly state that the voting shall be of
the entire capital stock, but probably the usual provision, "persons holding the larger amount in
value of the stock," has the same result. This interpretation would seem most consonant with
reason, and no cases indicating the contrary have been found. "Entire capital stock" means only
issued 4 stock. Missouri Valley Grocery Co. v. Hall, 45 N. D. 419, 178 N. W. 193 (1920).
1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1931) § 2763; Note (1938) 51
HARv. L. REV. 1074, 1083. See Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599, 613 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1913) for discussion of this point, and injra, p. 316.
5
1 See infra, p. 313.
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SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS

Increase.-Question has arisen as to whether a given transaction is an "increase" of indebtedness. It has been held that a mere change in the form of a
debt is not an increase within the meaning of the section, 16 as an obligation incurred as security for a pre-existing indebtedness. 17 Nor does it apply to an
original bond issue.' 8
There seems to be a dearth of authority as to whether it is an "increase" of
indebtedness for the management to borrow money with which to meet some
corporate obligation the immediacy of which makes the conversion of material
assets to meet it inconvenient or impossible, in a case where the corporation has
deliberately refrained from keeping a large amount of cash on hand because of
the desirability of utilizing all the corporate assets in the business. Such a case
might arise where the corporation has sufficient surplus with which to declare a
dividend, but little cash with which to pay it. Such a borrowing seems at first
sight to come within the consent provisions; however, the original indebtedness
would have been incurred at the time of the declaring of the dividend: to the
shareholders entitled thereto.1 9 The borrowing to secure such cash is thus closely
analogous to a refunding transaction and as such without the scope of the consent
provisions. The same problem could arist where the corporation carries on its
books a reserve or sinking fund to meet depreciation or obsolescence but keeps
the fund invested in property immediately useful in the business. In such case a
loan to purchase a new piece of major equipment floated without shareholder
consent would seem to be within the scope of the provisions, unless it could be
saved from their operation by the "usual course of business" doctrine noted below.
Indebtedness.-Difficult questions arise on the question of what constitutes
"indebtedness" within the scope of the provisions. It is said that the restriction
does not apply to a debt arising out of an implied contract, 20 nor an analogous
supra, § 2655.
1'7Ahl. v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. 319 (1877); Powell v. Blair, 133 Pa. 550, 19 Ad. 559 (1890).
It should be immaterial that the new creditor is a different person. See King County Land &
Livestock Co. v. Thomson, 21 Tex, Civ. App. 473, 51 S. W. 890, 897 (1899) ; Stuart v. Hall, 198
C. C. S. D. Cal., Ala. 73, 73 So. 390 (1916).
)$Union Loan & Trust Co. v. So. Cal. Motor Rd. Co., 51 Fed. 106 (C. C. S. D. Cal., 1892);
McKee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 159 Cal. 206, 113 Pac. 140 (1911); Merced River Elec. Co. v.
Curry, 157 Cal. 727, 109 Pac. 264 (1910). Contra: Maas v. Pa. Poughkeepsie & N. E. R. Co., 1
Monoghan 497 (Pa. 1889) ; Pittsburgh & State Line R. Co. v. Rothschild, 4 Cent. Rep. 106 (Pa.
1886); (semble). See Harrisburg & Eastern R. Co.'s Appeal, 1 Monoghan 692 (Pa. 1888).
1918 C. J. S. 1114, n. 97. There has been no intimation that declaratiors of a dividend re,
quires prior shareholder consent. On the contrary, it is said that this lies within the discretion of
the directors and may be enjoined by shareholders only if it is in impairment of, capital. 18 C. J.
S. 1142. Creditors have no standing to complain of a dividend declared out of surplus (ibid.) nor
are they generally permitted to assert stockholder consent provisions. (See infra, p. 314).
20See Humphrey v. Patrons' Mercantile Association, 50 Ia. 607 (1878) (recovery in quasicontract for money furnished by the manager of the company without consent of shareholders on
theory that shareholders protected by receipt of consideration); FLETCHER, op. cit. rupra, § 2582.
16FLETCHER, op. Cit.
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restriction to an unliquidated claim for damages."' It is likewise held that the
provision does not apply to notes given by the corporation to a shareholder for the
value of property given for a stock subscription in excess of th-e amount of the
The reasoning is not clear. In an opinion of the Attorney Gensubscription."
eral of Pennsylvania it was said that the restriction did not apply to mortgage
guarantee contracts, on the ground that these were not debts but merely a conditional liability.23 It might well be asked what effect a default on the part of
the mortgagor would have. There would certainly result an indebtedness on the
part of the corporation without the consent of the shareholders. A more plausible
basis for removing such contracts from the operation of the restriction would
appear to be that these contracts come within the rule as to debts incurred in the
ordinary course of the corporate business, discussed below.
The most important and significant of the limitations on the application of
the constitutional provisions, arising from judicial interpretation, is the rule that
stockholder consent is unnecessary where the indebtedness is incurred "in the
ordinary course of businLss." 2 1 This rule may well have had its origin in the
language of the English cases of Ex parte Chippendale, Re German Mining Company,25 Hawtayne v. Bourne,26 and Hawken v. Bourne.27 In these cases, the companies involved were joint stock companies operating under articles which contained provisions against borrowing. The manager in each case borrowed funds,
from certain shareholders or from third persons, with which to meet current
obligations. Upon winding up, it was sought to hold the shareholders generally
liable for the debt or advancement. A distinction was drawn in the German
Mining Company.case between that case and the Hawken case, on the one hand,
and the Hawlayne case on the other, based on the fact that the debts in the first
two were merely obligations for wages and supplies which the shareholders would
eventually have had to pay, becauve, such obligations being in the regular course
of business, they had thereby impliedly authorized the manager to contract them;
while in the last case the debt was to a bank and was not within the scope of the
implied authorization of the managing agent, because not within the usual
course of the business carried on.

2lWatkins et al. v. Cotton et al., 180 Okla. 73, 67 P.

(2d)

957 (1937).

22Krebs v. Oberrender, 274 Pa. 154, 118 Ad. 19 (1922).
28
1# re Philadelphia Co. for Guaranteeing Mortgages, 11 Dauph. Co. 224 (1908).
24
Manhattan Hardware Co. v. Phalen, 128 Pa. 110, 18 At. 428 (1889) ; West v. Dyson, 230
Pa. 619, 79 At. 782 (1911) ; Riesterer v. Horton Land & Lumber Co., 160 Mo. 141, 61 S. W.
238 (1901); Bennett v. Rittenhouse Short-Term B. & L. Assoc., 313 Pa. 391. 169 At!. 757 (1934) ;
Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Assoc., 314 Pa. 26, 170 At. 626 (1934); Curtis v. Natalie Anthracite Coal Co., 89 App. Div. 61, 85 N. Y. S. 413, aff'd 181 N. Y. 543, 73 N. E. 1122
(1905). The rule was enacted into the Pennsylvania statute in 1935. 15 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)
§ 2852-309.
254 De G. M. & G. 19 (1854).
267 M. & W. 595 (1841).
278 M. & W. 703 (1841).
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The analogy between the implied authorization to incur debts in the usual
course of business and an implied consent to the same is not unreasonably remote.
It is therefore submitted that, if a legal theory must be found as a basis for the
rule, it is an implied consent on the part of the shareholders that management
be free to incur or increase indebtedness in the usual course of business.
Practically, the basis for the rule is clear. The strict application of a requirement of a shareholders' meeting specially called with 30 or 60 days' written
notice before each action which would in any manner increase the corporate indebtedness, in the ordinary sense of the term, would swiftly paralyze the business
activity of every large modern business corporation. Plainly, there was need in
the interpretation of the provisions to restrict somewhat their application. This
need was met by decisions which, whether or not by the analogy to the joint
stock company cases above noted, held the stockholder consent provisions inapplicable to indebtedness incurred in the ordinary course of business.
This "rule" of course takes only such shape as is given it by judicial appli-8
cation. One of the leading cases is Manhattan Hardware Company v. Phalen.1
There, a corporate mortgage was given to secure a loan for the purpose of erecting
a new factory and moving the business into it. No previous consent of the
stockholders was obtained. The court allowed enforcement of the mortgage as
against the receiver of the corporation, indicating in its decision that it deemed this
indebtedness one incurred "in the conduct of its ordinary business." The case
need not have been considered authority for a proposition so broad, as there was
another ground-subsequent "ratification" by the shareholders-on which it was
decided. Nevertheless, it has been widely cited and followed as establishing the
"ordinary course of business" exception.
A second case which seems to give management extreme latitude in the face
of the consent provision is West v. Dyson.2 9 This was an action for damages for
breach of an agreement to lend money on a corporation mortgage given for the
purpose of liquidating past debts and for acquiring land and erecting buildings
thereon. The charter purposes of the company were of "erecting buildings, purchasing, holding, leasing, mortgaging, improving and selling real estate." The
court held that the defense-that the mortgage was invalid because given without
consent of the stockholders under the Pennsylvania Constitution-was insufficient,
because the mortgage was in fact valid, having been to secure debts contracted "in
the ordinary course of business." Despite the fact that the corporation's business
in this case was that of dealing in real estate, it would seem that the loan here
was of more than mere working capital. Doubt on this point apparently prompted
a cautious statement by the trial court that the question was a dubious one in the
abserce of a definite statement from the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, that court
28128 Pa. 110, 18 At. 428 (1889).
29230 Pa. 619, 79 At. 782 (1911).
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merely affirmed on the opinion of the lower court, leaving the doubt unanswered
as to the scope and limits of the exception relied on.
In two more recent cases,3 0 it was held that a promise by a building and
loan association to pay interest and principal of a first mortgage upon the
association's foreclosure of a second mortgage held by it, in consideration of the
first mortgagee's forbearing to execute on his mortgage, was valid and binding on
the corporation without the previously secured consent of the stockholders. The
courts proceeded on the theory that, since this was the only manner in which a
second mortgagee could hope to realize any of its investment in depreciated real
estate, it was in the usual course of the business of building and loan associations
and, therefore, within the rule excepting such indebtedness from the scope of the
consent provision. The courts laid stress on the factor of preservation of assets
through such a device. The materiality of this to the issue in an abstract sense is
questionable, but preservation of corporate assets is an eminently relevant consideration where the question is protection of stockholders' interests.
In only two cases does there appear to be any limitation actually applied to
th'e broad sweep of this exception. Both are weak cases. A common pleas court
has indicated by dictum that a loan for the purpose of "raising the funds necessary to purchase the real estate and the erection of buildings required for the
prosecution of its business" is not within the ordinary course of the corporation's
business." The significance of this, if any, lies chiefly in the fact that the case
has been cited virtually alone as placing a limit on the ordinary course of business
exception.3 2 And it is held that a corporation may assert the invalidity of bonds
issued by its predecessor the day after incorporation. 88 Obviously here, the corporation not yet having begun business, the indebtedness could not have been
found to be within the ordinary course of business.
EFFECT OF THE PROVISIONS

No less vexed is the question of what effect shall be given the provisions in
a case where there is an increase of indebtedness of a character within their scope,
without the previously secured consent of the stockholders in accord with constitutional direction. The words of the constitutions are of little aid: "The . . .
ind'ebtedness . . . shall not be increased . . . without the consent . . ." Considerations of fairness have led the courts to look beyond the form of the transaction, and to formulate rules strongly limiting the number of cases in which the
provisions may be successfully asserted.
20Bennett v. Rittenhouse Short-Term B.
Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Assoc., 314
SINicholas v. Putnam Machine Co. (2),
3ZSee, e. g., 19 C. J. S. 699.
S3Maas v. Pa., Poughkeepsie & N. E. R.
& Eastern R. Co.'s Appeal, 1 Monoghan 692

& L. Assoc., 313 Pa. 391, 169 Atl. 757 (1934)
Pa. 26, 170 Atd. 626 (1934).
7 North. Co. 137 (1900).
Co., I Monoghan 497 (Pa. 1889).
(Pa. 1888).

See Harrisburg
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Who may question the legality of the increase?-Although the purpose of
3 4
the consent provisions is generally said to be protection of the stockholders, it
has been held that the corporation itself may assert the lack of consent as a defense
to a bond issue. 35 And, under a statute requiring stockholder consent to a corporate mortgage, it is held, though not uniformly, that the trustee in bankruptcy
may assert thL lack of consent as a defense, 0 possibly on the theory that he represents the corporation and hence, ultimately, the stockholders. This view is questionable, since the trustee as a practical matter is more nearly a representative of
the creditors.3 7 Cases in which the corporation may question the legality of the
indebtedness are exceptional, however. Generally, the corporation may not assert
its lack of power to borrow as against iis creditor, who is bound to look merely
to the authority of the person representing the corporation. 88 It is not clear
whether the lack of stockholder consent affects the power of the corporation to
borrow or merely the authority of the management to do so,3 but certainly if the
creditor need look only to the authority of the management to represent the corporation, the consent of the shareholders is immaterial to him as against the corporation. The question of whether the corporation may assert the lack of consent
is largely academic, however, for in most cases some form of estoppel may be
applied against it.
It is well settled that the stockholders, for whose benefit the consent pro84

See discussion of Purpose, supra.
85Vail v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453 (1881) (receiver of corporation allowed to assert invalidity
of mortgage under analogous statute) ; Jackman v. Leffert, 227 N. Y. 310, 125 N. E. 446 (1919)
(court expressly refuses to follow protection of stockholders theory) ; Maas v. Pa., Poughkeepsie
& N. E. R. Co., 1 Monoghan 497 (Pa. 1889). See Pittsburgh & State Line R. Co. v. Rothschild,
4 Cent. Rep. 106 (Pa. 1886); Harrisburg and Eastern R. Co.'s Appeal, 1 Monoghan 692 (Pa.
1888). A distinction should be noted between cases which hold a mortgage "void" under a provision requiring consent to mortgages, and hence no lien in insolvency proceedings (e. g. Matter
of James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) and cases under the general indebtedness
provisions here involved, because the former often leave the debt standing, striking down merely
the security. The different considerations involved under the latter and more stringent type of
provision are apparent.
36Maryland Cas. Co. v. Schaefer Const. Co., 141 Misc. 629, 253 N. Y. S. 709 (Sup. Ct.
1930) aff'd mem. 256 N. Y. 663, 177 N. E. 183 (1931); In re Lincoln Bakery, Inc., 18 F. Supp.
998 (D. Mass. 1937) ; In re Astell Engineering & Iron Works, Inc., 284 Fed. 967 (C. C. A. 2d,
1922) ; Matter of Day & Niger, Inc.. 29 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 11 (Referee, N. D. N. Y., 1935),
(1936) 49 HARV. L. Rev. 481. An equity receiver was allowed to attack a mortgage in Commerce
Trust Co. v. Chandler, et al, 284 Fed. 737 (C. C. A. Ist, 1922). Outside New York, and Massachusetts. however, judicial statement at least indicates that the trustee or receiver will in no case
be permitted to assert lack of consent. Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599, 613
(C. C. A. 8th, 1913); Stuart v. Holt, 198 Ala. 73, 73 So. 390 (1916). See Note (1938) 51
HAR. L. REv. 1074, 1078.
87
See Note (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 1074, 1078. Though that note deals with consent. tc
mortgage statutes, there is no consideration there applied in this connection which is not, in some
degree at least, relevant here.
8
3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra, § 2618.
39Compare In re Lincoln Bakery, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 998 (D. Mass. 1937) with Westerlund
v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913).
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visions exist, may assert the illegality of the loan. 40 Thus, a shareholder may
enjoin an increase of indebtedness sought to be incurred in violation of a prohibition of fictitious indebtedness. 41 The question whether the shareholders
themselves might secure a rescission in a proper case seems not to have arisen. It
is submitted that where all other requisites to rescission are present, this remedy
would be available! 2 The availability of lack of consent as a d-efense to enforcement of the obligation by the creditor is greatly limited in the case of stockholders
by the doctrines of waiver or Lstoppel discussed below. But it has been specifically
held that where stockholders' consent to a bond issue was obtained by fraud this
4
may be asserted in their behalf as a ground for rescission.
The prevailing view seems to be that third persons may not complain of
lack of proper formality in the increasing of indebtedness.44 Thus, it is held that
mere creditors of the corporation may not assert the invalidity of such indebtedness. 46 There is authority to the opposite effect under other restrictive provisions
as to bond issues,' 6 and it has been held in a bankruptcy proceeding that a mortgage secured without formal consent in accordance with a statute requiring the
same was subject to collateral attack and did not constitute a lien.' 7 But even
though creditors generally be permitted to attack the legality of the loan, those
who extended credit subsequently with knowledge of the prior indebtedness can*8
not assert the illegality of such prior indebtedness.
Against whom may the illegality not be asserted?-When the indebtedness is
evidenced by the issuance of negotiable securities, it is generally held that failure
of the corporate debtor to comply with internal rules in the issuance may not be
asserted as against a bona fide holder. 49 This rule seems not to depend entirely
40Boyd v. Heron, 125 Cal. 453, 58 Pac. 64 (1899). See Powell v. Blair, 133 Pa. 550, 19
At. 559 (1890); Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913);
Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 11 So. 428 (1892) ; Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Royal, 209
Ala. 439, 96 So. 620, 621 (1923).
Ice and Industries Co. v. Crane, 142 Ala. 620, 39 So. 233 (1905).
41American
42See Powell v. Blair, 133 Pa. 550, 19 At. 559 (1890) (debt not within scope of provision;
stockholders' standing to seek rescission not questioned).
43A. B. Leach & Co. v. Grant, 54 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 6th. 1932) cert. denied 286 U. 5'.
(receiver permitted cancellation of an illegal bond issue held by fraudulent creditor).
546 (1932)
4
4 See 13 AM. JuR. 901.
5
4 McKee v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 159 Cal. 206, 113 Pac. 140 (1911) ; Anderson v. Bullock

Co. Bank, 122 Ala. 275, 25 So. 523 (1899); Hammonkd Lumber Co. v. Adams, 7 Cal. (2d) 24,
59 P.6(2d) 1030 (1936).
4 Keystone National Bank v. Palos Coal & Coke Co., 150 Ala. 245, 43 So. 570 (1907);
Bingaman v. Commonwealth Tr. Co., 15 F. (2d) 119 (M. D. Pa. 1926). Compare Mann v.
Mann,7 57 N. D. 550, 223 N. W. 186 (1929).
4 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Schaefer Const. Co., 141 Misc. 629, 253 N. Y. S. 709 (Sup. Ct.
1930) aff'd mem. 256 N. Y. 663, 177 N. E. 183 (1931); Matter of James, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 555
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929); In re Lincoln Bakery, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 998 (D. Mass. 1937). Con-tra:
Stuart4 v. Holt, 198 Ala. 73, 73 So. 390 (1916).
Contra: Bingaman v. CommonSMann v. Mann, 57 N. D. 550, 223 N. W. 186 (1929).
wealth4 9 Tr. Co., 15 F. (2d) 119 (M. D. Pa. 1926).
Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 552 (1899); State v. Cobb,
64 Ala. 127 (1879).
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upon negotiable instruments law, for it has been held (1) that the burden is on
the bondholder to show that bonds issued without sufficient formality are obligations of the corporation; 5 0 (2) that the bona fide holder may assert validity only
to the extent of the consideration received by the corporation; 5 1 and it is said (3)
that lack of consent isno defense "at least where [the stockholders] took no
steps to repudiate the action of the directors but allowed bonds to be sold and
availed themselves of the proceeds." 5 2 Whether this doctrine would be extended
to instruments not strictly negotiable is doubtful, with perhaps the more weighty
considerations leading to a negative result.
Liability of Directors.-There is no suggestion in any of the cases involving
consent provisions of the kind here under discussion that a violating of the provision by the directors will subject them to any extraordinary liability, either to
the creditor or to the shareholders. 55 Some statutes limiting the amount of debt a
corporation might incur have included provisions for personal liability of the
directors upon incurring debt in excess of such limitation. These have been con54
strued strictly in favor of the directors, on the theory that they are penal statutes.
Since this is the case even with an express statutory liability, a fortiori the courts
will not hold the directors to any extraordinary liability arising impliedly out of
disregard of stockholder consent provisions. It is submitted that the result should
be otherwise where the disregarding amounts to fraud.
Substitutionary Elements.-A writer in discussing provisions for stockholder
consent in the execution of corporate mortgages,5 5 a problem in many respects
an.aogous to the present one, has classified under nine heads circumstances which
may operate to effectuate such instruments in the absence of compliance with
statutory formalities relating to consent. Some or all of these are equally applicable to the present problem and are discussed briefly below.
(1) Ratification. A formal ratification of an increase in indebtedness
appears in no case involving the general increase of indebtedness provisions. It
has been held in connection with the mortgage provisions that a subsequent ratification by more than the required proportion of the stockholders will validate the
mortgage from the date of the ratification. 56 There seems to be no reason why
the analogy should not be applied to a case under the general increase restrictions.
5OHiclas v. Fruen Cereal Co., 182 Minn. 93, 233 N. W. 828 (1930).
SlPeatman
v. Centerville Light, Heat & Power Co.. 100 Ia. 245, 69 N. W. 541 (1896).
2
5 FLBTCHER, op. Cil. supra, § 2754.
The North
53But see Watkins c at. v. Cotton.ei al., 180 Okla. 73, 67 P. (2d) 957 (1937).

Dakota statute (CoMp. L. 1913 § 4559) expressly places personal liability on the directors and/or
officers4 responsible.
5 Woolverton v. Taylor, 132 1l. 197, 23 N. E. 1007 (1890); Margrage & Green Co. v.
9 Pa. Super. 438 (1899).
Zeigler,
55
Note (1938)

51 HAnV. L. REv. 1074.

I 6 Rochester Savings Bank v. Averell, 96 N. Y. 467 (1814).
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(2)
Waiver. This is a term much used by courts in finding a factual
substitute for consent. 51 As pointed out by the writer of the note above mentioned, cases of true waiver are rare, and when present relate to the formalities.
The shareholders cannot, in the very nature of things, waive the actual consent
without giving it in fact. When the question has arisen, most courts are inclined
to permit a waiver of formalities attendant upon the giving of consent, such as
the 30 or 60 days notice and the special meeting. The cases are not uniform on
the point.5 8
(3) Laches. Circumstances which will constitute laches almost invariably
also constitute an "estoppel" under the type of consent provision here under
discussion.
(4)
Estoppel. Used in a broad and perhaps inaccurate sense, estoppel is
found and applied to prevent assertion of lack of consent in a large proportion of
the cases. Such 'stoppel apparently consists of (a) retention of the benefits of
the indebtedness by the corporation after (b) knowledge thereof by the stockholders.5 9 The effect of such estoppel is to bar assertion of the lack of consent by
both stockholders and corporation.60 It is submitted that retention of benefits
will be present in virtually every case in which the question of consent will arise,
for complaint of the increase will rarely be made while the corporation is still
sufficiently sound financially to permit of a return of the benefits, tangible or
intangible, of the indebtedness. As for the second element, little effort seems
to be mad-e to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge on the part of the
required number of the stockholders, this being assumed after the elapse of a
certain length of time, 6' in the absence of special circumstances affecting the
possibility or probability of knowledge. The same broad principle has been used
62
to nullify an attempted revocation of consent by stockholders.
It should be pointed out that it would be at least inconvenient for the
shareholders, confronted with a fait accompli even where they actually become
57

See Nelson v. Hubbard, 96 Ala. 238, 11 So. 428 (1892); Reisterer v. Horton Land & L.

Co., 160 Mo. 141, 61 S. W. 238 (1901); Note (1938) 51 HARV. L. REV. 1074.
58
1n re Constantine Tobacco Co., 290 Fed. 128 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ; Hillcrest Land Co. v.

Foshee, 189 Ala. 217, 66 So. 478 (1914); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Schaefer Const. Co., 141 Misc.
269, 253 N.Y. S. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1930) aff'd mer. 256 N. Y. 663, 177 N. E. 183 (1931). Contra:
In re Lincoln Bakery, 18 F. Supp. 998 (D. Mass. 1937) (though directors owned sufficient stock
to constitute required majority). See Tally-on-Top Salesbook Co., 17 Pa. C. C. 199 (1895) (meeting may not be waived because of public interest in deliberation beford increase of stock).
59
Manhattan Hardware Co. v. Phalen, 128 Pa. 110, 18 At. 428 (1889) ; In re Quigley Motor
Sales. 0Inc., 75 F. (2d) 253 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
G Mann v. Mann, 57 N. D. 550, 223 N. W. 186 (1929); Manhattan Hardware Co. v. Phalen,
128 Pa. 110, 18 Ad. 428 (1889).
61Manhattan Hardware Co. v. Phalen, rupra note 60. Cf. In re Quigley Motor Sales, Inc., 75
P. (2d) 253 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), where court places burden of proof to show knowledge upon
the creditor seeking to assert the estoppel. The case appears to be unique in exacting this requirement.6 2
Columbia Nat. Bank v. Williamsport Gas Co. et al., 17 Phila. 617 (C. P. 1884) afl'd 42
Leg. Int. 226 (Pa. 1885).
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aware of the illegal increase, to set about not retaining the consideration. Broad
application of the estoppel doctrine would seem to constitute in practical effect
a forced consent on the part of the shareholders of the average corporation. It
was to avoid this that the constitutional provisions embody requirements of formal
notice to them, and to the same end was the statutory machinery implementing
these requirements set up. If the interests of third persons demand the existence
of an estoppel doctrine in these cases, it would be only consistent with judicial
declarations that the provisions are for the protection of the shareholders for the
courts to apply the doctrine very cautiously, requiring a showing of real knowledge
of the facts on the part of the shareholders before penalizing their lack of action,
and even then doing so only in situations where by some feasible course of action
the shareholders could remedy the condition.
(5) Retention of benefits. This fact, in the absence of knowledge by the
stockholders, logically estops the corporation, though not necessarily the stockholders, from setting up lack of consent as a defense."S
(6) Executed transactions. It is doubtful whether the mere fact that the
any legal effect except as it bears upon the
transaction is executed would have
64
question of retention of benefits.
(7)

Negotiable instruments.

This factor has already been considered.

"Indoor management." The writer above referred to considers this
(8)
theory-that it cannot be asserted against a third person that the internal affairs
of the corporation were conducted improperly-as being primarily an English
doctrine and of little significance in the United States. The applicability of similar
theories is discussed above under the heads of persons who may deny validity, and
against whom illegality may not be asserted.65
(9) Estoppel through recitals in the instrument. In several of the cases,
the instrument evidencing the indebtedness in question has contained a recital indicating that all the requisite formalities have been complied with, when this was
6

3But see note 60, supra.
64A distinction has been made between transactions which the corporation lacks power to enter
(ultra vires) and those which are within its powers with certain requirements super-added (consent
provisions). See Westerlund v. Black Bear Mining Co., 203 Fed. 599, 612 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913).
It would seem that if common law policy discouraged the avoidance of executed ultra vires transactions, the same policy should apply a jortior; here. If there be any valid connection between consent provisions and the ultra vires doctrine, it would seem that modern statutes abolishing the latter
as a defense against third persons should also work an increasing liberalization of consent provisions as to third persons. The virtue of such reasoning in the present case is questionable, in
view of the more direct protection of stockholders sought by the consent provisions.
6
eSee statutes abolishing defense of ultra vires, e. g. 15 Pure. STATs. (Pa.) § 2852-303, and
note 64, supra, Such statutes seem to tend toward a broader acceptance of the theory in the United
States.
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contrary to fact. 6" These recitals were treated as being of little if any importance
to the result and were not strongly urged by counsel. In the absence of other
grounds for holding the debt enforceable despite lack of proper consent, it is
conceivable that defense by the corporation might be barred by such a recital.
One additional curative element might be mentioned. Under the mortgage
statutes, the question has arisen whether an actual contemporaneous assent by the
shareholders without the formalities of notice or special meeting will supplant
the statutory requirements. There is conflict on the point.67 It is submitted that
a court, in dealing with the more sweeping provisions as to increase of indebtedness, would make short shrift of an attempt by a corporation or a stockholder to
assert lack of consent as against a creditor, when stockholders in sufficient number
had in fact assented to the increase at the time of its incurrence.
CONCLUSION

The conclusion is inescapable that provisions for consent of stockholders to
an increase of corporate indebtedness are of little real value as currently applied
by the courts. Perhaps this is the result of their being couched in language too
broad to make them practicable. Certainly this seems to have been their impression on the minds of the courts. ThL exception as to debts incurred in the ordinary
course of business can only have been the result of the inclusion of every kind of
credit transaction within the literal scope of the constitutional provision. That
the exception is so broad seems the result of the lack of signposts to guide the
course of interpretation, plus the readiness on the part of the courts to place
considerations of business convenience ahead of protection of stockholders. That
the force of the provisions is further diminished to the point of virtual non-oxistence by unwillingness to give them effect to the detriment of creditors or other
third persons may also be laid to the lack of positive enactment governing their
effect. That some such device as this can be a potent factor in a redemocratizing
of business practice is clear, but if the shareholders are to be aided by consent provisions in a recapture of the traditional spirit and function of owners and ultimate
managers of the corporation, a more positive definition of scope, and some declaration of effect, are necessary. Further legislation is called for.
THOMAS I. MYERS
66Manhattan Hardware Co. v. Phalen, 128 Pa. 110, 18 AtI. 428 (1889).
See also West v.
Dyson, 230 Pa. 619, 79 Atl. 782 (1911); Bennett v. Rittenhouse Short-Term B. & L. Assoc., 313
Pa. 391, 169 AlI. 757 (1934); Aarons v. Public Service B. & L. Assoc., 314 Pa. 26, 170 At. 626

(1934).
67

Obligation valid: Black v. Ellis, 129 App. Div. 140, 113 N. Y. S. 558 (1st Dept. 1908)
aff'd on oiher grounds 197 N. Y. 402, 90 N. E, 958 (1910); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Schaefer
Const. Co., 141 Misc. 629, 252 N. Y. S. 709 (Sup. Ct. 1930) aff'd mem. 256 N. Y. 663, 177 N. E.
183 (1931). Contra: Matter of Joseph, 46 F. (2d) 324 (W. D. N. Y. 1931) 30 MICH. L. REV.
302; In re Lincoln Bakery, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 998 (D. Mass. 1937).

